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Comments 15

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000200020004-8
DCI/IC 74-2367/1

30 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
[redacted]

SUBJECT : Comments on Proposed DCI Letter to General Graham
re Warning Mechanisms

1. Attached is a line-in/line-out redraft of the letter to General Graham, draft of which was provided members of the Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working Group on 25 October. As indicated in the margin of the redraft, the changes reflect comments from CIA, DIA and NSA/CSS.

2. [redacted] has requested that further consideration of the draft await [redacted] return on 4 November since he has previously expressed concern with developments underway to change the watch mechanisms. [redacted] said he had discussed this matter with INR personnel involved with ICS in the development of papers dealing with warning, and they wondered as to the reason for Intelligence Panel involvement in the same matter. [redacted] has no specific proposals for amending the draft he was provided on Friday. He noted he had been advised that previous INR discussions with ICS representatives had not indicated the scope of the Strategic Warning Committee would be as wide as was stated in the material within quotes in the last paragraph of 25 October draft. This widening posed no problems to State, however.

3. Also attached is a 29 October letter from [redacted] which at paragraph 3 indicates a continuing disagreement with the proposal that "a separate analytic staff need be organized under the DCI to prepare the daily temperature reading of the posture of the military forces of our major adversaries and the indication that these forces may be bent on hostile action."

4. [redacted] states that "our concept of the staff required to prepare the daily temperature reading is one which taps and questions the existing community assets, rather than overshadows them. We believe that such a staff could truly be small and could function on behalf of the DCI while integrated into the DIA organization."

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5. The issue which needs to be faced directly is the independence, or lack thereof, of the analytic staff which would be created. Is it merely located in the NMIC or is it part and parcel of the NMIC.

[Redacted]

Director, Coordination Staff

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Attachments: a/s

Distribution:

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DCI/IC 74-2367

30 October 1974

LETTER TO GENERAL GRAHAM

Dear Danny:

25X1 I have reviewed carefully DIA's views on revision of the Watch mechanism which [] forwarded to me in your absence. In general outline, they coincide very closely with my own -- in fact, my only serious reservation concerning them is the propriety of my delegating to any one element of the community a responsibility that is clearly national in scope and of such critical importance. There is also the practical difficulty of my being able to provide strategic warning to WASG WSAG effectively if I am at one remove the mechanism designed to support me in this function.

At the same time, I fully agree with the proposition that the strategic warning mechanism should be intimately tied to the warning mechanisms and procedures of the Department of Defense.

25X1 It seems to me that both these requirements can be satisfied by my appointment of one of your deputies, and I have in mind specifically [] as Chairman of a small USIB Committee to act as the high level overview group referred to in [] letter. The Committee would ~~in-turn-be-supported-by~~ monitor the activities of a small, highly qualified analytic staff headed by a CIA representative,

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who would ~~also-serve-on-the-committee-as-its-vice-chairman-~~ report

directly to [] The DCI would, in addition, nominate a

senior CIA officer to serve as [] vice-Chairman. The

staff, composed of senior analysts representatives from DIA, CIA, NSA

and the State Department, would be co-located with the NMIC, on which

it would rely for communications and other support, including the

24-hour "watch" function currently being conducted within the NIC.

I think we are fully agreed that the mission of this big "W" warning mechanism should have a relatively narrow focus. The language I favor, and which I understand has been substantially agreed to by your representatives, is that the Strategic Warning Committee and staff "will be responsible for providing the earliest possible warning of military action against the U.S. or its allies, particularly by the USSR or the PRC. It will also be responsible for providing warning of military action ~~in-developing-exists-situations~~ by a major adversary, in any area which ~~could~~ would involve U.S. forces." Warning of all other critical developments which should be brought to the attention of the WASG WSAG -- whether military technological, political or economic -- would be provided by Alert Memoranda produced under the direction of the NIOs and by normal current intelligence reporting.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

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